The Heterogeneous Labor Market Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic by Cortes, Guido Matias & Forsythe, Eliza C.
Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 
5-28-2020 
The Heterogeneous Labor Market Impacts of the Covid-19 
Pandemic 
Guido Matias Cortes 
York University, gmcortes@yorku.ca 
Eliza C. Forsythe 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, eforsyth@illinois.edu 
Upjohn Institute working paper ; 20-327 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
Cortes, Guido Matias and Eliza C. Forsythe. 2020. "The Heterogeneous Labor Market Impacts of the 
Covid-19 Pandemic." Upjohn Institute Working Paper 20-327. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp20-327 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
Upjohn Institute working papers are meant to stimulate discussion and criticism among the 
policy research community. Content and opinions are the sole responsibility of the author. 
The Heterogeneous Labor Market Impacts 
of the Covid-19 Pandemic 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper 20-327 








We study the distributional consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic’s impacts on employment. 
Using CPS data on stocks and flows, we show that the pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing 
inequalities. Although employment losses have been widespread, they have been substantially 
larger in lower-paying occupations and industries. Individuals from disadvantaged groups, such 
as Hispanics, younger workers, those with lower levels of education, and women, have suffered 
both larger increases in job losses and larger decreases in hiring rates. Occupational and industry 
affiliation can explain only part of the increased job losses among these groups. 
JEL Classification Codes:  E24, J21, J31, J62, J63 
Key Words:  Covid-19, CPS, job losses, occupations, industries, distributional impacts 
Acknowledgments:  This research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. 
1 Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic led to a 10.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate in April 2020 (BLS, 2020). A fifth of individuals who were employed in February
2020 were no longer employed as of mid-April.1 Although no sector of the economy
was left unscathed, employment losses were especially severe in industries such as food
services, recreation, and accommodation (BLS, 2020). In this paper we analyze the het-
erogeneity of the pandemic-induced employment losses across occupations, industries,
and demographic groups, and the distributional consequences of these changes.
Using data through April 2020 from the Current Population Survey (CPS) — the
primary source of labor force statistics for the United States — we document three
key facts. First, we show that the pandemic-induced reductions in employment, and
the associated increases in employment exit rates and decreases in hiring rates, were
disproportionately concentrated in low-wage jobs. Service sector employment suffered
the worst outcomes, but even within service sector industries, job losses were greater
for lower-wage occupations. Second, we show that job losses were disproportionately
concentrated among younger workers, those with less education, racial and ethnic mi-
norities, and women. Third, we show that, with the exception of women, the dispro-
portionate job losses for workers from disadvantaged groups cannot be fully explained
by their pre-pandemic industry and occupation affiliation.
We match individuals across months in the CPS in order to identify individuals who
were employed before the pandemic (in February 2020) and follow them through March
and April. We find that 40% of individuals who exited employment between February
and April are now classified as out-of-the-labor-force. Further, we show the massive
decrease in employment in April 2020 was driven by individuals exiting employment,
with over 90% of the decrease in employment due to exits and the balance attributable
to reduced hiring. This is in contrast to evidence from previous recessions that firm
hiring is the dominant factor driving employment declines (c.f. Elsby et al., 2009; Fujita
& Ramey, 2009; Shimer, 2012).
We rank occupations and industries according to their average wages before the
onset of the pandemic, following the literature on labor market polarization (e.g. Ace-
moglu & Autor, 2011; Autor et al., 2006; Goos & Manning, 2007).2 We then use
1See Figure 1.
2We use the average wage in January and February 2020; the ranking is nearly identical if we use
the average wage in 2019.
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a regression-based approach in order to isolate the impact of the pandemic on em-
ployment at different points of the distribution from occupation- or industry-specific
seasonal patterns and longer-term trends.3
Our results indicate that the decline in employment and the associated increase
in the employment exit rate observed during the pandemic were disproportionately
concentrated in lower-paying occupations and industries. Some of the highest-paid
occupations, such as Architecture and Engineering, and Computer and Mathematical
Occupations, in fact saw negligible declines in employment, whereas nearly all occupa-
tions in the bottom quartile of the occupational wage distribution experienced strong
employment declines. Similar patterns are observed across industries. This indicates
that the pandemic is exacerbating pre-existing inequalities, with the impacts being
most strongly felt among individuals in lower-paying jobs.4 Notably, we also find that
the disproportionate negative impacts on lower-paying occupations are also observed
within industries.
Turning to the heterogeneous impact of the pandemic across demographic groups,
we find that young, less educated, non-white workers, and women experienced the
largest employment losses. These workers are disproportionately employed in low-wage
and service sector jobs, and hence their increased rates of job loss can be partially
explained by their pre-displacement industry and occupation affiliations. Importantly,
however, we find that, for most disadvantaged groups, at least 25% of the increase in
job loss occurs within detailed occupations and industries, implying that workers from
these disadvantaged groups saw more severe employment losses even when compared
with other workers in similar jobs. This is further confirmed by the fact that most oc-
cupations experienced a decline in the within-occupation share of young, less-educated,
and non-white workers between February and April. A similar pattern is also observed
within industries. Women are the exception, with job losses fully explained by sex
segregation into jobs that experienced larger losses.
The literature on the labor market impacts of Covid-19 is growing rapidly. A bur-
geoning literature uses O*NET occupational characteristics to evaluate which jobs can
be performed remotely and which jobs are likely to be at risk due to social distancing
3Given the magnitude of the shock induced by the pandemic, our qualitative results are not sensitive
to the approach taken to control for seasonality and/or longer term trends.
4Though we focus only on employment outcomes, an additional factor exacerbating these already
stark inequalities is the possibility that those who remain employed in these lower-paying occupations
are increasingly exposed to the virus due to the limited possibilities of remote working offered by these
occupations (see e.g. Ruiz-Euler et al., 2020).
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requirements. Dingel & Neiman (2020) classify occupations according to whether or
not they can be performed remotely, which Montenovo et al. (2020), Mongey et al.
(2020), and Béland et al. (2020) build upon, showing better labor market outcomes for
workers in occupations that were more likely to be able to work from home or were less
likely to have to work in close proximity to others. Kahn et al. (2020), however, show
that the rise in unemployment claims and the fall in vacancy postings through April
are not well explained by whether the occupation can work-from-home, indicating the
economic slowdown is broad-based.
Our work complements these contributions by highlighting the distributional effects
across occupations and industries and the disproportionate impacts on workers in lower-
paid jobs. Our evidence is in line with the findings of Hoynes et al. (2012) regarding
the disproportionate impacts of previous recessions on individuals who were already
economically disadvantaged. Related evidence on the disproportionate impact of the
Covid-19 shock on lower paid workers is presented by Cajner et al. (2020) using data
from ADP, a large U.S. payroll processing company.5 Using CPS data, and consistent
with our findings, Montenovo et al. (2020) find larger decreases in employment for His-
panics, workers aged 20 to 24, and those with high school degrees and some college. By
ranking occupations and industries in terms of their mean wages, and thus structuring
our analysis along distributional lines, our results complement their findings, which
focus on occupational task dimensions. Moreover, by exploiting labor market flows, we
are able to consider the role of pre-displacement occupational and industry affiliation
in accounting for the differentials observed across demographic groups not only for un-
employed workers but also for those who transition to being classified as being out of
the labor force.6
2 Data and Aggregate Patterns
Our analysis is based on monthly data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The CPS is sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor
5See also Adams-Prassl et al. (2020), who conduct a survey in the UK, and find that young workers
and lower-income individuals are disproportionately likely to have lost their job or suffered hours losses.
6We find that 40% of individuals who exited employment between February and April are now
classified as out-of-the-labor-force. Given that the CPS does not record prior occupation or industry
information for individuals who are out of the labor force (outside of those in the outgoing rotation
groups), an analysis that aims to understand the role of prior occupation and industry based solely
on cross-sectional data would miss an important fraction of the workers suffering Covid-induced job
losses.
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Statistics (BLS). We rely on the microdata made publicly available by IPUMS (Flood
et al., 2018). To construct employment flows, we follow Madrian & Lefgren (1999),
matching monthly files using administrative IDs and confirming matches based on sex,
race, and age. We restrict the sample to non-institutionalized civilians aged 16 and
older. Most specifications use data from January 2015 through April 2020.
The CPS records respondents’ labor market status during a particular reference
week, which is always the week that spans the 12th of the month. For March 2020 the
reference week was March 8–14 and for April 2020 it was April 12–18. The majority
of the major lock-down orders and other strict social distancing measures had not yet
been implemented by the time of the March survey.7 Hence, the March 2020 CPS data
only captures the very early effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. For most of the analysis,
we focus on the patterns observed in April 2020, using earlier data to make adjustments
for seasonal patterns and time trends as discussed in further detail below. All patterns
shown are based on weighted outcomes using CPS composite weights.8
Figure 1 displays overall aggregate patterns over time. Panel A shows the evolution
of the employment rate since January 1976. The solid blue line is the standard official
employment rate, using all individuals who are classified as employed in a given month.
The dashed red line displays an adjusted employment rate which excludes certain in-
dividuals who are likely to have been mis-classified as employed during the pandemic.
Specifically, in April 2020, there was a large increase in the group of individuals who
report that they were employed but absent from work for reasons other than the ones
enumerated by the CPS (such as vacation or illness). While this group is typically less
than 0.5% of the population, it grew to almost 5% in April 2020. The BLS has argued
that these individuals who are absent for “other” reasons should likely be classified as
7Data from the Department of Labor shows that initial unemployment insurance claims totaled
250,892 in the week ending March 14 – a substantial increase relative to the previous week (25.2
percent), but nowhere near the unprecedented levels that were observed in subsequent weeks (see
https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf).
8Between 95,000 and 100,000 working-aged individuals are sampled by the CPS each month. Re-
sponse rates fell during the pandemic, to 85,000 in March and 82,000 in April. For our flow analysis,
this implies that (non-scheduled) attrition from the sample increases from around 8% between 2015
and 2019 to around 13% during the pandemic. The BLS, however, has stated that “although the col-
lection rates were adversely affected by pandemic-related issues, BLS was still able to obtain estimates
that met our standards for accuracy and reliability” (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-
covid19-faq-april-2020.pdf). For the flow analysis, we weight using the most recent month’s weights in
order to account for attrition over recent months. Our results also confirm that the patterns observed
in the flow data are very consistent with the observed changes in stocks along the different dimensions
that we consider.
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temporary layoffs.9 However, nearly one-quarter of individuals who were absent for
“other” reasons in April 2020 report being paid by their employer for their time off.
We therefore compute an adjusted employment rate (shown by the red dashed line)
that excludes individuals who are classified as employed but (i) were absent from work
during the reference week, (ii) report being absent for “other” reasons, and (iii) report
that they were not paid by their employer for their time off.10 Workers satisfying these
three criteria are instead classified as unemployed.
Regardless of whether the standard or the adjusted employment rate is consid-
ered, the decline observed in April 2020 is very dramatic by historical standards. The
official employment rate falls from 60.8% in February to 51.3% in April 2020. The
adjusted employment rate, which historically differs from the official employment rate
only marginally, falls further, from 60.7% in February to 48.9% in April. We use these
adjusted measures of employment and non-employment for the remainder of our anal-
ysis.
Panels B and C of Figure 1 illustrate the associated labor market flows between
employment and non-employment since January 1994. Each flow is expressed as a share
of employment in the previous month. Panel B shows that outflows from employment to
unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force (NILF) both increased dramatically in April
2020. From 2015 through 2019, the average monthly exit rate to unemployment was
1.4%. This increased to 2.6% in March 2020 and 14.8% in April 2020. Exits to NILF
averaged 3.1% from 2015 through 2019, but increased to 3.4% in March 2020 and 6.3%
in April 2020. Thus, 21% of individuals employed in February 2020 were no longer
employed by April.
Panel C of Figure 1 displays the hire rates from from unemployment and NILF as
shares of the previous month’s employment. Here we see that the inflow rate has also
changed, but less dramatically. Hire rates from unemployment averaged 1.0% from
2015 to 2019, but fell to 0.78% in March 2020 and 0.76% in April 2020. Hires from
NILF averaged 2.1% from 2015 through 2019, but fell to 1.8% in March 2020 and 1.2%
in April. However, compared to the four-fold increase in exit rates, hiring remains
comparatively robust by April 2020.
These results indicate that over 90% of the dramatic rise in non-employment is due
to exits from employment, rather than decreased hiring. This contrasts with the pattern
9https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2020.pdf
10Given the magnitude of the shock, this adjustment is not crucial for any of the qualitative patterns
that we document in the paper.
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typically observed during recessions, where a collapse in hiring is usually the dominant
driver of increased unemployment rates (c.f. Elsby et al., 2009; Fujita & Ramey, 2009;
Shimer, 2012).
Isolating the impact of the pandemic from seasonal patterns and time trends
Our paper explores heterogeneities in the employment effects of the pandemic across
occupations, industries, and demographic groups. In order to isolate the pandemic-
related changes from patterns related to seasonality or longer-term time trends (which
may be particularly important for certain occupations, industries, or demographic
groups), we estimate a series of regressions using data from January 2015 to April
2020. The regressions are estimated using collapsed data at the group level for each
month (where groups may be either occupations, industries or demographic categories),
and are run separately for each group. The regression takes the following form:
Ygt = γgDm(t) + αgDy(t) + θgD2020M3 + δgD2020M4 + εgt (1)
Ygt is the outcome variable of interest for group g in period t. For the stock analysis,
this is the employment rate of group g in a given month. For hires and exits, we use
matched data over two-month windows (e.g. February–April), and calculate the rates of
hiring and exiting as shares of employment in the first month of the window.11 Dm(t) is
a vector of calendar month dummies. The coefficient γg captures any seasonal variation
in outcomes that are specific to the group being considered. Dy(t) is a vector of year
dummies, so that αg accounts for year-by-year variation in the outcome of interest
for the specific group. D2020M3 and D2020M4 are dummies for March and April 2020,
respectively.12 We include the March 2020 dummy given that some important deviations
in outcomes are already observed in that month. However, our key coefficient of interest
is δg, which captures group-specific deviations in the outcome of interest in April 2020,
once seasonal effects and longer-run time trends have been accounted for. While our
analysis focuses on the estimated pandemic-related effects δ̂g, results are qualitatively
similar if focusing on raw changes over time, given that the resulting adjustments for
seasonality and time trends are relatively small compared to the magnitude of the Covid
11We prefer the use of two-month windows given that the effects of the pandemic start to be
noticeable in the data in March 2020. The two-month window from February to April 2020 therefore
captures the full effect of the pandemic.
12In the matched data, April 2020, for example, represents an indicator variable for individuals who
are matched from February 2020 to April 2020.
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shock.
3 Distributional Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic
As is well known, the Covid-19 crisis has led many sectors of the economy to be shut
down, while also requiring production to be severely altered in other sectors. Under
shelter-in-place orders only essential businesses are allowed to operate, while all other
businesses must suspend operations or have their employees work remotely. Even in
states that do not have strict shelter-in-place laws, consumer spending patterns have
shown a dramatic slowdown in business for restaurants, gyms, and hair salons.13 Thus,
we expect significantly heterogeneous impacts across different types of jobs, leading to
differential impacts across workers, with potentially important distributional implica-
tions.
3.1 Heterogeneous Impacts across Occupations and Industries
Following a similar approach to the literature on job polarization (e.g. Acemoglu
& Autor, 2011), we analyze the distributional impacts of the pandemic by ranking oc-
cupations and industries based on their mean hourly wages in the pre-crisis period of
January and February 2020.14 For occupations, we focus on 22 2-digit SOC occupa-
tions, which are detailed in Table 1 (ranked from lowest- to highest-paying).15 The
lowest-paying occupations include Food Preparation and Serving, Personal Care, and
Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations, while the highest-paying occupations include
Management, Legal, and Computer and Mathematical Occupations. For industries, we
focus on 13 major industry categories, which are listed in Table 2 (also from lowest- to
highest-paying). The lowest-paying industries include Leisure, Hospitality and Trade,
while the highest-paying include Professional and Business Services, Financial Activi-
ties, and Mining.
13See for instance https://slate.com/business/2020/05/south-reopening-restaurants-coronavirus-
opentable.html
14The ranking is nearly identical if we use average wages for 2019. Hourly wages are taken directly
from the data if available, or computed as weekly earnings divided by usual (or actual) hours worked per
week. As in Lemieux (2006), top-coded earnings are adjusted by a factor of 1.4. We convert nominal
values to 2009 dollars based on the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI, All Urban Consumers) from
the BLS.
15Some results at a finer occupational level are presented in the Appendix. While occupational
codes used in the CPS changed in January 2020 (from 2010 to 2018 Census code categories), the
changes are relatively minor and do not affect the comparability over time at the 2-digit SOC level.
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Figure 2 explores how the employment losses observed in aggregate as of April 2020
are distributed across occupations. The figure plots the estimated coefficient δ̂g from
Equation (1) for each 2-digit occupation (indicating the change in the dependent vari-
able in April 2020 after controlling for seasonality and year fixed effects), along with
a 95% confidence interval. Occupations are ranked from lowest-paying on the left to
highest-paying on the right, as listed in Table 1. Panel A plots the changes in em-
ployment rates (employment in each occupation as a share of the total population). A
clear pattern emerges: the impact of the pandemic is quite heterogeneous across oc-
cupations, with lower-paying occupations experiencing significantly larger contractions
in employment. In particular, the 12 lowest-paying occupations experience statistically
significant and quantitatively large declines in employment, with the only exception
being Farming, Fishing and Forestry occupations (wage rank 3).16 Meanwhile, neither
Architecture and Engineering Occupations (the third-highest paying) nor Computer and
Mathematical Occupations (the highest-paying in the sample) experience statistically
significant employment declines; in fact, Computer and Mathematical Occupations are
the only ones to experience an increase in employment during the pandemic, although
this increase is not statistically significant.
Appendix Figure A.1 plots the raw changes in employment rates between February
and April 2020 using information at the more granular 4-digit occupation level. Occu-
pations are assigned to (employment-weighted) percentiles based on their mean wage
in the pre-pandemic period of January and February 2020. The figure plots changes in
employment per capita for occupations at each percentile of the distribution. This con-
firms our finding that the impacts of the pandemic were much stronger for lower-paying
occupations. The occupations with the largest employment declines, which account for
more than a quarter of a percentage point decline in the aggregate employment rate
each, include waiters (1st percentile), cashiers (4th), cooks (7th), maids (9th), laborers
(18th) and retail salespersons (20th).17
In Panels B and C of Figure 2 we examine the hire rate from non-employment and
the exit rate to non-employment for each occupation. These rates are calculated as a
share of employment in the first month of the 2-month span, so the rate in April 2020
16The other two low-paying occupations with relatively small employment declines are Healthcare
Support Occupations (ranked 5th) and Protective Service Occupations (ranked 10th).
17There are also some notable exceptions. Occupations with below-median wages that experience
increases in employment per capita between February and April 2020 include religious workers (12th
percentile), couriers and messengers (26th), eligibility interviewers for government programs (31st),
farmers (37th), public safety telecommunicators (40th), and emergency medical technicians (47th).
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is expressed as a share of employment in February 2020. This puts both inflows and
outflows on the same denominator, which makes it easier to compare relative magni-
tudes.18
Consistent with what we saw in Figure 1, the magnitude of the increase in exit
rates shown in Panel C dwarfs the small decrease in hiring in Panel B. Here we see
that many occupations do not register a statistically significant decrease in hiring in
April 2020. However, a few do stand out: food preparation and serving occupations
experienced a 6 percentage point decrease in hiring in April 2020, while cleaning and
maintenance occupations saw a 3 percentage point decline. The occupations with larger
decreases in hiring are clustered at the low end of the wage spectrum; however, two
mid-ranked occupations (construction and community/social services) also experienced
a 2-3 percentage point decrease in hiring rates.
Panel C of Figure 2 analyzes exit rates from each occupation. Here we see even
more dramatic differences. For food preparation and serving occupations there is a 48
percentage point increase in the share of individuals employed in February 2020 who
are now non-employed. Personal care occupations shed an extra 58 percentage points of
their workers between February and April. Other occupations with exit rate increases
of over 20 percentage points include cleaning and maintenance (rank 4), transportation
(rank 6), production (rank 7), construction (rank 11), and arts and entertainment (rank
15). The highest wage-rank occupations, such as management, engineering, legal and
computer occupations, all have exit rate increases of under 10 percentage points. Thus,
the lowest-wage occupations are clearly the worst affected by the dramatic rise in job
loss.
We next turn our attention to industries rather than occupations. Figure 3 shows
how employment losses are distributed across industries, once again ranked from lowest-
paying on the left to highest-paying on the right, as listed in Table 2. Panel A shows
widespread impacts on employment, with the largest declines being in the Leisure and
Hospitality sector (the lowest-paying industry), and the Education and Health Services
sector (ranked 6th from the bottom). Declines are small in the Agricultural sector
(second lowest-paying), as well as in some high-paying sectors such as Information,
Public Administration and Mining.
In the remaining panels of Figure 3 we analyze the changes in industry-level inflows
and outflows.19 In Panel B we again see that most industries did not see a statistically
18The estimated coefficients from Panels B and C are detailed in Appendix Table A.1.
19The estimated coefficients from Panels B and C are detailed in Appendix Table A.2
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significant decrease in hiring as of April 2020. However, three industries stand out:
Leisure and Hospitality (4.9 percentage point decline), Information (3.3 percentage
point decline), and Construction (2.5 percentage point decline). Meanwhile, Panel C
shows that Leisure and Hospitality workers saw a 42 percentage point increase in exit
rates in April 2020 and workers in Other Services industries saw a 35 percentage point
increase. No other industries had an increase over 20 percentage points, while the
four highest-paying industries (Public Administration, Professional Services, Financial
Activities, and Mining) all saw increases in exit rates of under 12 percentage points.
The key takeaway from these results is that the pandemic has disproportionately
affected low-wage jobs, with particularly dramatic effects on service-sector occupations
and industries. In order to investigate whether both the occupation and the indus-
try dimensions are independently informative, we focus on the two industries with the
largest increase in exit rates: Leisure and Hospitality, and Other Services. We then
replicate the exit specification from Figure 2 within these industries, focusing on the
larger occupational groups that are employed therein.20 Figure 4 shows that there is a
strong relationship between occupational wage ranks and exit rates, even within these
industries. The lowest-wage occupations (Food Preparation, Personal Care, and Clean-
ing) exhibit increases in exit rates of over 45 percentage points, while the high-pay
managerial occupations show an increase in exit rates of 18 percentage points. For each
occupational group, exit rates are higher within the service sector compared with the
average for the occupation, indicating that displacement is worse across occupations in
more-affected industries. This confirms that both the occupation and the industry di-
mensions are informative about job loss, in both cases indicating higher job destruction
rates for lower-paid jobs.
3.2 Heterogeneous Impacts across Demographic Subgroups
It is well known that the demographic composition of employment varies substan-
tially between high- and low-paying jobs, with women and non-white, less educated, and
younger workers over-represented in low-wage jobs. We show this directly in Appendix
Figures A.2 and A.3.
Table 3 presents the estimated impact of the pandemic on the employment out-
comes of different demographic groups, once again using our regression approach to
account for group-specific seasonality patterns and longer-term trends. Column (1)
20SOC 2-digit occupations with at least 150 observations in February 2020 in the matched data.
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displays the employment-to-population ratio for each group in the pre-pandemic period
of February 2020. Columns (2) and (3) show the estimated impact on this ratio, in per-
centage points, while Columns (4) and (5) show the estimated impact as a proportion
of the group’s total employment in February 2020. Several interesting results emerge.
Both male and female employment to population ratios fall by approximately the same
amount (12 percentage points). This, however, translates into significantly different
declines in terms of the share of employment lost: 18% in the case of men and 22%
in the case of women. This is due to the lower baseline employment rate for women.
We can therefore infer that the pandemic had a stronger impact on women, given that
a larger proportion of female employment was lost as compared to the fraction of lost
male employment.
When considering differences across education groups, we see a monotonic pattern
when focusing on the share of employment lost, as displayed in Column (4): the largest
employment losses are among individuals with no high school degree, where the pan-
demic eliminated more than one-third of employment for this group between February
and April 2020. Meanwhile, pandemic-related employment losses were below 9% for
workers with a college degree. The remaining rows of Table 3 show larger employment
losses for non-white workers, particularly Hispanics, as well as substantially larger losses
for workers under 25 compared to older workers.
In Columns (6) through (10) we analyze the impact on labor market flows by de-
mographic group. As before, flows are expressed relative to employment two months
previously. We display the coefficient for April 2020, which reflects the change in flows
from February to April relative to employment in February 2020, after controlling for
typical transition rates for that demographic. Across demographics, we see that, con-
sistent with the patterns observed for employment stocks, female workers, non-white
workers (and particularly Hispanics), young workers, and those with less education ex-
perienced both larger increases in exit rates and larger decreases in hire rates. The
comparison of Columns (4) and (10) indicates that the stock- and flow-based measures
of employment contraction produce similar estimates for the percentage change in em-
ployment, confirming the reliability of an analysis based on flows, in spite of the recent
increase in attrition rates.
Overall, we observe similar patterns in job loss across demographics as in past re-
cessions, as documented by Hoynes et al. (2012), with the major exception being the
rates for men. Recessions often are worse for men; however, we have found substan-
tially larger impacts on women, consistent with what Alon et al. (2020) hypothesized.
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Although the main driver in employment changes are exit rates, we do see that the
decrease in youth hiring is four times that of older workers, a result that is consis-
tent with Forsythe (2020), that shows firms disproportionately reduce hiring of young
workers during recessions.
3.3 Do Occupations and Industries Explain Heterogeneous Im-
pacts across Demographic Subgroups?
So far we have shown the dramatically differential impacts of the Covid-19 crisis
across occupations and industries as well as across demographic groups. In this sec-
tion, we investigate whether the disproportionate employment losses experienced by
disadvantaged demographic groups are due to the fact that they are over-represented
in the jobs that contracted most sharply (as shown in Figures A.2 and A.3), or if these
workers experienced worse losses within job categories.
In order to answer this question, we focus on outflows from employment, which, as
shown above, are the dominant margin of adjustment driving the employment decline
during the crisis. The use of outflow data allows us to consider the pre-displacement
occupation and industry for all workers switching out of employment, including those
who transition out of the labor force.21 We determine the extent to which the dif-
ferential impact of the pandemic across demographic groups is accounted for by their
pre-displacement occupation and industry by running a new set of regressions as follows:
Yit = ωDdemo(i) + θD2020M3 + δD2020M4 ×Ddemo(i) + γDm(t) ×Ddemo(i) (2)
+ρDocc(it) + βD2020M4 ×Docc(it) + αDy(t) + εit
Equation (2) differs from Equation (1) in two ways. First, instead of running re-
gressions using observations at the demographic group level, we now directly use the
individual-level data, pooling all demographic groups together. Yit is an indicator vari-
able which is equal to one for individuals who transition out of employment. We regress
this on the interaction of demographic indicators with a dummy variable for April 2020,
21As we have seen, a substantial fraction of those exiting employment between February and April
transitioned to being out of the labor force, and the CPS would not record the prior occupation or
industry for the majority of these individuals in the cross-sectional data. An additional advantage
of using the flow data is the fact that the occupational information for non-employed individuals is
independently coded in the CPS. Independent coding is known to lead to substantial mismeasure-
ment, even at highly aggregated levels of occupational classification (Kambourov & Manovskii, 2013;
Moscarini & Thomsson, 2007).
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while also controlling for year and demographic group fixed effects, as well as fully in-
teracted calendar month and demographic group indicators. Our coefficient of interest,
δ, estimates differential changes in exit rates across demographic groups, while still al-
lowing for baseline and seasonal differences in each group’s employment exit patterns.
Second, we introduce successive occupation and industry fixed effects, both directly
and interacted with the April 2020 indicator. This controls for differences in exit rates
between job types under typical conditions, as well as differences in job loss by job type
that are specific to the Covid-19 pandemic. To the extent that the differences between
demographic groups are explained by their pre-displacement occupation or industry
affiliation, the estimated coefficient δ̂ should be driven to zero once these controls are
introduced. An estimate of δ̂ that differs from zero even after controlling for occu-
pations or industries would indicate differential exit rates across demographic groups
occurring within job types.
Figure 5 plots the estimated δ̂ coefficients from Equation (2), along with 95% con-
fidence intervals. We first show the baseline differentials between groups, before intro-
ducing any occupation or industry controls (blue bars). We then show results when
introducing 2-digit occupation fixed effects (red bars), major industry groups (green
bars), and both 2-digit occupation and major industry controls (orange bars). Finally,
we show results from a specification that includes fixed effects at the most detailed oc-
cupation and industry levels available in the CPS (grey bars). All coefficients reported
are relative to the omitted group, which in the respective panels are males, whites,
26-35 year olds, and college graduates. The estimated coefficients are also reported in
Appendix Table A.3.
The top left panel shows that female employment exit rates increased by 3.5 per-
centage points more than male employment exit rates in April 2020. When we control
for 2-digit occupations and major industry there is little difference in the gap, but once
we control for detailed occupation and industry the gap disappears. This means that
all of the elevated exit rate for women is due to the types of jobs they work in (at a
detailed level), rather than differences within narrowly defined jobs.
The top right panel of Figure 5 shows that two-digit occupations can explain most
of the increased exit rate for black workers over white workers. For Hispanics, the most
detailed controls can explain at most 70% of the gap, meaning that 30% of the elevated
exit rate for Hispanics is occurring within narrowly defined occupations and industries.
For all other non-white races, the most detailed controls can account for only half of
the gap.
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In the bottom left panel of Figure 5 we see that workers under 25 had a 11.8 per-
centage point larger increase in exit rates compared to 26-35 year-olds. This difference
is reduced by 66% after controlling for detailed occupations and industries. For the 56
and up age category, exit rates increased by 2 percentage points more than for 26-35
year-olds; this difference, however, does not change with the inclusion of occupation or
industry controls – in fact, the differential becomes slightly larger when these controls
are included – indicating that all of the increase in exit rates for older workers occurred
within narrowly defined jobs.
In the bottom right panel of Figure 5 we see that individuals without a high school
degree saw a pandemic-related increase in exit rates 18 percentage points larger than
that of college graduates. Occupation and industry fixed effects bring the gap down
to 6 percentage points, leaving 38% of the difference in exit rates unexplained. We see
similar results for high school graduates and workers with some college, with the most
detailed controls leaving 33% and 26% of the gaps unexplained, respectively.
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 4. While differences in
employment patterns across occupations and industries can account for a majority of
the differences in the increase in exit rates across demographic groups for all groups
except the oldest workers, only for women can all of the gap be explained by occupation
and industry sorting. For most of the analyzed disadvantaged groups, at least 25% of
the increase in job loss occurs within detailed occupations and industries. Hence, these
workers are not only being affected by the fact that they tend to be segregated into
more exposed occupations and industries, but they are also more likely to transition
out of employment when compared to other workers in very similar jobs.
As a final way to visualize this pattern, Figure 6 illustrates the change between
February and April 2020 in the within-occupation employment share of different groups.
If the impacts across demographic groups were purely driven by occupation-level shocks,
we would not expect to observe changes in these groups’ shares of employment within
occupations. The figure, however, shows that the shares of female, young, less-educated
and non-white workers declined between February and April within the vast majority of
2-digit occupations. This confirms that these workers are experiencing disproportionate
job displacement even within 2-digit occupations. Similar patterns are observed across
industries in Appendix Figure A.4.
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4 Conclusion
The economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic has been widespread. The mag-
nitude of the employment losses, however, has differed substantially across different
types of jobs and different types of workers. This paper shows that the pandemic has
had the effect of exacerbating pre-existing inequalities. Workers employed in lower-
paying occupations and industries have been disproportionately impacted, given that
employment declines have been significantly larger among lower-paying job categories.
These asymmetric occupation- and industry-level effects may reflect heterogeneities in
the extent to which different jobs can be performed remotely (see Brynjolfsson et al.,
2020; Dingel & Neiman, 2020), as well as differences in which types of businesses have
been allowed to continue to operate during the pandemic.
Importantly, the differential impact on disadvantaged groups extends beyond their
exposure due to their occupation and industry affiliation. Even within detailed occu-
pations and industries we find that Hispanic, less-educated, and younger workers have
suffered disproportionate declines in their employment rates.
Going forward, it will be important for policymakers to pay particular attention
to these disadvantaged groups, who were not only more likely to be in a constrained
economic situation before the pandemic, but have also been disproportionately likely
to be impacted by it.
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Figure 4: Impact of the Pandemic on Employment Exit Rates across Occupations


































Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficient δ̂g from Equation (1) for each occupation, using data
from the Leisure and Hospitality, and Other Service industries only. The estimated coefficients indicate
the change in the exit rate for each occupation in April 2020 after controlling for seasonality and year
fixed effects. Occupations are ranked from lowest- to highest-paying based on their mean wage in
January and February 2020.
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Figure 5: Exits from Employment: Differentials across Demographic Groups with Dif-

























HS Dropout HS Grad Some College
Baseline 2-Digit Occupation
Major Industry Both
Detailed Occ. and Ind.
Note: The figure displays the estimated coefficients δ̂ from Equation (2) across demographic groups,
indicating the change in the probability of transitioning out of employment for each demographic
group between February and April 2020, relative to the omitted category (males, whites, 26-35 year
olds, and college graduates, respectively), after controlling for group-specific seasonality as well as year
fixed effects. Each bar color represents the results from a regression that includes a different set of
occupation or industry controls (directly and interacted with an April 2020 dummy), as listed at the
bottom of the graph.
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Note: The figure plots the change in the share of different demographic groups among workers in each
2-digit occupation over the course of the pandemic (February to April 2020). Occupations are ranked
based on their average wages in the pre-pandemic period of January and February 2020. The size of
each circle is proportional to the size of the occupation in February 2020.
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Table 1: Changes in Employment by Occupation
2-digit Occupation Wage Rank Log Real Wage ∆ Emp/Pop
SOC (1=lowest) (Jan-Feb 2020) Feb-Apr 2020
35 Food Prep and Serving 1 2.22 -1.81
39 Personal Care, Service 2 2.42 -1.03
45 Farm, Fish, Forestry 3 2.45 -0.04
37 Cleaning, Maintenance 4 2.46 -0.51
31 Healthcare Support 5 2.50 -0.29
53 Transportation 6 2.63 -1.01
51 Production 7 2.69 -0.84
43 Office/Admin Support 8 2.69 -1.03
41 Sales and Related 9 2.73 -1.41
33 Protective Service 10 2.85 -0.17
47 Construction, Extraction 11 2.88 -0.81
49 Installation, Maintenance 12 2.89 -0.32
21 Community/Social Service 13 2.96 -0.06
25 Education 14 2.98 -0.62
27 Arts, Entertainment, Media 15 3.06 -0.34
29 Healthcare 16 3.22 -0.43
19 Science 17 3.26 -0.02
13 Business/Financial Op 18 3.28 -0.28
11 Management 19 3.33 -0.53
17 Architecture/Engineering 20 3.41 -0.11
23 Legal 21 3.43 -0.07
15 Computer/Mathematical 22 3.43 0.02
Note: Occupations are ranked from lowest- to highest-paying based on their mean wage in January
and February 2020. Our employment measure excludes individuals who were absent from work during
the reference week for “other” reasons and report not being paid by their employer for their time off.
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Table 2: Changes in Employment by Industry
BLS Industry Wage Rank Log Real Wage ∆ Emp/Pop
Code (1=lowest) (Jan-Feb 2020) Feb-Apr 2020
11 Leisure & Hospitality 1 2.41 -2.73
1 Agriculture 2 2.52 -0.04
5 Trade 3 2.67 -1.58
12 Other Services 4 2.72 -1.07
6 Transp & Utilities 5 2.92 -0.49
10 Educational & Health 6 2.93 -2.27
3 Construction 7 2.94 -0.96
4 Manufacturing 8 2.96 -0.95
7 Information 9 3.08 -0.15
13 Public Administration 10 3.08 -0.15
9 Professional & Business 11 3.11 -0.93
8 Financial Activities 12 3.16 -0.36
2 Mining 13 3.28 -0.05
Note: Industries are ranked from lowest- to highest-paying based on their mean wage in January and
February 2020. Our employment measure excludes individuals who were absent from work during the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Share of Increased Exit Rates Explained by Occupation and Industry
Share explained by:
2-Dig SOC Major Detailed Detailed Both
Gap Occ. Ind. Both Occ. Ind. Detailed
Female 3.46 6.6 -1.7 9.2 79.8 72.8 102.9
16 to 25 11.8 47.0 40.8 58.0 57.6 44.2 66.1
35 to 55 0.21 495.2 -328.6 -461.9 -414.3 -533.3 -719
56 to 85 2.30 -13.0 -29.6 -31.7 -15.2 -24.8 -31.7
No HS Degree 18.1 52.5 32.6 64.7 61.9 32.6 68.8
HS Graduate 11.9 49.9 24.5 58.8 62.5 30.1 67.3
Some College 9.36 44.7 23.2 51.8 68.1 35.9 73.8
Black 1.79 81.6 12.3 72.6 111.2 11.2 88.8
Hispanic 6.08 59.0 25.3 63.3 71.1 38.2 69.9
Other Non-White 5.22 21.1 22.8 28.9 48.9 33.9 49.2
Note: The first column displays the estimated gap in the impact of the pandemic on employment exit
rates for each demographic group relative to the omitted category (males, whites, 26-35 year olds, and
college graduates, respectively) based on the regression results in Table A.3. The remaining columns
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Note: The figure plots changes between February and April 2020 in adjusted employment rates for
occupations at each percentile of the employment-weighted occupational wage distribution (where the
assignment to percentiles is based on employment and wages in the pre-pandemic period of January
and February 2020).
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Note: The figure plots the share of different demographic groups among workers in each 2-digit oc-
cupation before the onset of the pandemic (February 2020). Occupations are ranked based on their
average wages in the pre-pandemic period of January and February 2020. The size of each circle is
proportional to the size of the occupation in February 2020.
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Note: The figure plots the share of different demographic groups among workers in each major industry
category before the onset of the pandemic (February 2020). Industries are ranked based on their average
wages in the pre-pandemic period of January and February 2020. The size of each circle is proportional
to the size of the industry in February 2020.
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Note: The figure plots the change in the share of different demographic groups among workers in each
major industry over the course of the pandemic (February to April 2020). Industries are ranked based
on their average wages in the pre-pandemic period of January and February 2020. The size of each
circle is proportional to the size of the industry in February 2020.
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Table A.1: Estimated Coefficients from Figure 2
Exits (Panel C) Hires (Panel B)
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Food Prep and Serving 47.67*** (1.49) -5.78*** (1.54)
Personal Care 58.22*** (1.30) -0.93 (1.18)
Farm, Fish, Forestry 6.90 (4.11) -4.19 (3.62)
Cleaning, Maintenance 27.10*** (1.13) -3.22* (1.36)
Healthcare Support 13.23*** (1.53) -1.14 (1.43)
Transportation 23.78*** (1.07) -1.59 (0.95)
Production 21.12*** (0.82) -0.92 (0.87)
Office/Admin Support 14.35*** (0.73) -1.68** (0.54)
Sales and Related 18.53*** (0.74) -1.34* (0.65)
Protective Service 10.80*** (1.45) -1.19 (1.32)
Construction, Extraction 22.26*** (1.16) -2.74* (1.04)
Installation, Maintenance 12.86*** (1.09) -0.27 (1.04)
Community/Social Service 6.98*** (1.43) -2.40** (0.87)
Education 17.01*** (0.91) -1.25 (1.10)
Arts, Entertainment, Media 24.23*** (1.66) -0.73 (1.40)
Healthcare 10.74*** (0.68) 0.73 (0.48)
Science 8.48*** (1.86) -0.75 (1.85)
Business/Financial Op 7.50*** (0.99) -0.65 (0.64)
Management 8.66*** (0.51) -0.68+ (0.35)
Engineering 6.80*** (1.31) -1.21 (0.89)
Legal 8.25*** (1.32) -0.86 (1.49)
Computer/Mathematical 4.84*** (1.04) 0.64 (0.77)
The table lists the estimated coefficients δ̂g from Equation (1) for each 2-digit occupation, indicating
the change in the dependent variable (exits or hires) in April 2020 as a fraction of employment in
February 2020 after controlling for seasonality and year fixed effects. Occupations are ranked from
lowest- to highest-paying based on their mean wage in January and February 2020.
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Table A.2: Estimated Coefficients from Figure 3
Exits (Panel C) Hires (Panel B)
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Leisure and Hospitality 42.60*** (1.33) -4.90*** (1.19)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 5.98* (2.48) -2.36 (1.46)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18.81*** (0.74) -1.38* (0.65)
Other Services 34.63*** (1.06) -1.22 (0.89)
Transportation and Utilities 14.46*** (0.87) 0.00 (1.01)
Educational and Health Services 14.94*** (0.59) -0.72+ (0.39)
Construction 19.61*** (1.08) -2.54** (0.89)
Manufacturing 14.95*** (0.58) -0.34 (0.41)
Information 15.15*** (1.59) -3.27** (1.07)
Public Administration 6.08*** (1.12) -0.03 (1.04)
Professional and Business Services 11.18*** (0.63) -1.39** (0.49)
Financial Activities 7.57*** (0.72) -0.10 (0.61)
Mining 8.43** (2.92) -1.33 (2.40)
Note: The table lists the estimated coefficients δ̂g from Equation (1) for each major industry, indicating
the change in the dependent variable (exits or hires) in April 2020 as a fraction of employment in
February 2020 after controlling for seasonality and year fixed effects. Industries are ranked from
lowest- to highest-paying based on their mean wage in January and February 2020.
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